BENT v. WAKEFIELD, &a., BANK.

very freshness being the result of the washing with tannic acid.
Thus also in a case of tromyl'oeil in a French court; the ring or
border of paste which had previously united the two papers could
at once have been brought in view by 'washing the paper with a
solution of iodine. It seems that in the French courts every manipulation or experiment necessary to elucidate the truth in the
case, even to the destruction of the document in question, is
allowed, the court as a matter of precaution, being first furnished
with a certified copy of the same.
In the many cases of alleged fraudulent papers put in my hands
for examination, I have rarely found any insurmountable difficulty
in coming to a conclusion, such conclusion being based upon the
principles which I have set down as requisite in my opinion, to be
acted upon in all this class of testimony. As in cases involving
blood examinations each case must be investigated by itself alone,
as in almost every case new facts present themselves. Still general principles may be laid down so that with the aid of the
microscope and other necessary instruments, and chemical re-agents,
one may be prepared to solve this class of questions with almost
unerring certainty, or at least to avoid coming to any wrong conclusions. Thus it will be seen that as I view the subject, this
important class of testimony in all its phases, as now managed in
the courts, so far from furthering the ends of justice, is more
calculated to favor the wrongdoer; that there is no inherent necessity of such a condition of things, either in the nature of the
subject itself, or in the present state of scientific knowledge; but
that the fault is wholly due to the practice of the courts, which are
governed in this respect, in most cases, by tradition and precedent
rather than by logical reasoning or scientific deduction.
R. U. PIPER.
Chicago, Ills.
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Where a reward is offered for information leading to the apprehension of a
felon, a police constable, to whom the felon has voluntarily offered to surrender
himself, is not entitled to the reward.
England v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856, commented upon.

THIS was an action tried before GRovE, J., at the Bristol Summer Assizes 1878. It was reserved for further consideration.
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The facts of the case and the arguments on further consideration
sufficiently appear in the judgment.
Arthur 6harles, Q. C., for the plaintiff, cited Smith v. .Moore, 1
C. B. 438; Tngland v Davidgon, 11 A. & E. 856.
if. . Cole, Q. C., and Templer, for the defendants, cited
Thatcher v. FBAnand, 3 C. B. 254; Lancaster v. WaZSh, 4 M. &
W. 16; Snowden on Constables, p. 152; (fowles v. Dunbar, 2
C. &P. 565.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GROvE, J.-This case was tried before me at-Bristol at the last
summer assize. It was an action for a reward of 2001. offered in
a handbill, published by the defendants, in the following terms:
"2001. Whereas, on the 26th of June last, William Glover, shoddy
and mungo dealer, of Osset, absconded from Osset, after committing
various forgeries on several manufacturing firms in the West Riding *ofYorkshire; notice is hereby given that the above reward
will be paid to any person or persons giving such information to
Mr. William Airton, superintendent of police, Dewsbury, or to
Mr. William Halls, superintendent of police, Wakefield, as will
lead to the apprehension of the said William Glover. West Riding
Police Office, Wakefield, 27th of July 1877."
The plaintiff's case, on which my judgment must be founded,
was shortly stated as follows: On the 80th of November 1877, a
person presented himself at the police office, Exeter, and on the
plaintiff, who was chief constable for Exeter, being sent for, the
man, who was, in fact, Glover, said, according to the plaintiff's evidence, "You hold a warrant for me. I am wanted for forgery."
The plaintiff asked his name and what he was. He said, "You
know already, and hold the warrant." Some further conversation
took place. The plaintiff thought the man was out of his mind, or
had been drinking, and recommended him to go to an hotel. The
plaintiff then left him in a private room, searched the "Police
Gazette," and found the name "William. Glover," wanted for
forgery. He got him to take off his hat, and in his own words,
"I satisfied myself after reading the " Police Gazette' when he
took his hat off." The plaintiff then telegraphed to Mr. .Airton,
superintendent at Dewsbury, "Do you hold warrant for the apprehension of William Glover, for forgery ?" and received a telegram
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in return, "I still hold warrant for Glover, and should like him to
be apprehended." Upon that the plaintiff apprehended and charged
the man, who was ultimately convicted.
For the defendant, evidence was given to prove that Glover gave
his name before the telegram was sent, and also that he was taken
into custody before it w*as sent. I left these two.questions to the
jury, and they found that Glover was not in custody before the
telegrams, but could not agree, and after being locked up were discharged as to the first question; counsel agreeing that they would
accept the finding on the second question for the purposes of the
case.
The point reserved and argued before me, on further consideration, was whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to the reward.
For the plaintiff, it was argued that he was the person to be taken
to have given the information leading to the apprehension, within
the meaning of the handbill; for the defendants, that the criminal
Glover had given the information himself; and, secondly, that on
grounds of public policy, the plaintiff was not entitled to the reward.
I am of opinion that the defendants are entitled to judgment. It
was not contended that the mere fact of being the person who first
communicated with Airton, would be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to success, supposing the information to have been given to the
plaintiff by some one other than the criminal himself; indeed the
very able and learned counsel for the plaintiff said, in answer to me
(though I do not wish, and ought not to tie him to his admission),
that if Glover had given information to Airton, Airton would have'
been entitled to the reward. I think he could hardly have avoided
this admission. Airton and Halls, it seems to me, are persons mentioned as proper to be communicated with; but if the information
had been given direct to those offering the reward, and had led to
the apprehension, I should consider that sufficient. In Lancaster
v. Wal1h, where no person was named to receive the information,
but the reward was to be given on application to the defendant, Mr.
Baron PARKE says : "It seems to me that any communication to
the constable, whose duty it was to search for the offender, was
within the terms of the handbill, although there was no proof of a
communication to the defendant himself." In the same case it is
held by the same learned judge that "the party who first gave the
information, and he alone, is to have the benefit ;" and Mr. Baron
ALDERS ON says: "1Information means the communication of material
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facts for the first time." It appears to me that the first information
given in the present case to a person authorized to act was that
given by the criminal himself; and although he, on grounds of
public policy, ought not to be entitled to the reward, still, where a
constable may apprehend a criminal (Snowden on Constables, p.
152; Com. Dig. tit. Justices of Peace, B. 79), is the mere channel
of communication, and only makes inquiries for the purpose of satisfying himself, be is not the person giving the information within
the true meaning of the advertisement. The apprehension is not the
consequence of the constable's information, but of the criminal's
surrender of himself to justice. To use the words of Chief Justice
TINDAL, in the case of Thatcher v. Fmgland, "The clue once found,
the plaintiff, in apprehending, did no more than his ordinary duty."
It was argued that, in the case of Thatcher v. Bngland,the first
information was given by the criminal, and yet that the person who
communicated that information was the party entitled; but there
the communication by the criminal was not made to any one
authorized to act in apprehending or procuring his apprehension,
but to a person whom seemingly he considered a friend, for the
purpose of borrowing money to enable him to go to London and
dispose of the property stolen. The communication by the criminal there was not in the nature of information to be acted upon for
the purpose of apprehension, and, had the person to whom it was
made kept the secret, would not have led to his conviction. In
that case it was also held, that though the first police constable to
whom the communication was made by his activity and perseverance succeeded in tracing or recovering nearly the whole of the
property, and in procuring evidence to convict the thief, he was
not entitled to the reward.
The cases mainly relied on for the plaintiff were England v.
-Davidson and Smith v. Moore. The first of these cases bears
more on the question of public policy than on the point to which I
have hitherto adverted. It was there held, on demurrer, that the
fact of the person giving the information being a constable did not
necessarily disentitle him on the ground of want of consideration,
it being his duty to discover and apprehend felons, or on grounds
of public policy. In that case the averments in the declaration
were general, viz: that the plaintiff did give such information as
led to the conviction, and in the plea tlaat the plaintiff was and is
a constable of the district, and that it was his duty to give every
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information which might lead to the conviction, and to apprehend
him. The short judgment of the court, delivered by Lord DENMAN, is as follows: "I think there may be services which the constable is not bound to render, and which he may, therefore, make
the ground of a contract. We should not hold a contract to be
against the policy of the law unless the grounds for so deciding
were very clear." All that that case decides is that a constable
as such is not disentitled to a reward of this description, or necessarily disentitled as against public policy. In Smith v. Moore a
police constable then temporarily suspended apprehended a burglar,
who, after his apprehension voluntarily confessed. The constable
was held entitled to the reward. There is in that case the obvious
distinction from the present that the confession was made after the
apprehension effected by the person claiming the reward, who, by
his suspicions, and by apprehending on the strength of them, had
already done much, probably enough, to earn it.
On the question of public policy I am bound by the case of England v. Davidson, so far as the judgment in that case extends, and
although there may be some distinction as to this point between
that case and the present, yet in deciding a case on the ground of
public policy, the decision should be based on some broad principle,
and one capable of general application. I am unable to see any
general principle other than that argued in Enqlanda v. -Davidson,
viz., that a constable is bound by his duty, the duty of his office, to
seek for criminals, and to use his utmost efforts to bring them to
justice. There are strong arguments of expediency touching the
administration of justice and the interest of the state, why constables.should not be allowed to receive rewards. The expectation of
rewards would offer great temptation to delay an active search, by
which delay the criminal might escape, or in a case like the present
to delay taking into custody a criminal who gives himself up, so
that the constable might appear to use exertions to procure complete
information, and for that to claim the reward. There would also be
a temptation, particularly to those constables in the detective service, to look to bribes or to seek promises of rewards from persons
anxious to recover their property, and unless such were offered to
be inert in their efforts. But although the judgment in England
v. Davidson does not enter upon those questions, I must assume
that they were present to the minds of the judges who decided that
case. Whatever my own opinion may be, it seems to me that I
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cannot without over-subtle refinement apply to this case any general
principle of public policy which is not involved in that case. If
that case is to be reviewed, it must be reviewed in a court of appeal.
The first point is sufficient to decide this case, and I give judgment for the defendants.
Notwithstanding the court in this case thereupon. The plaintiff was a day
preferred to rest its decision upon the inspector of customs, and was not asspecial and particular ground, that the signed to inspect a steamer which arplaintiff was not really the person who rived in the night, but did so, and seized
gave the information which led to the some goods intended tUbe smuggled, and
apprehension of the offender, rather than the owners thereof were convicted on
on the broad grounds of public policy, his testimony. He gave information to
yet it is well settled, in America at least, the defendants of all the facts and claimed
that officers can not recover a reward the reward; but he was not allowed
offered, when they do only what their to recover, upon the broad ground of
duty requires, or when acting solely public policy, because he was acting as
officer of the customs, and although not
under their official authority,
This is well illustrated by the case of exactly on duty as such, at the moment,
but rather a volunteer, he was still actPool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219 (1849).
The city had offered a reward of $2000 ing in his right as an officer, and could
for "the detection and conviction of any not otherwise have had any authority to
The plaintiff, a city -interfere at all; and while so acting,
incendiaries."
watchman, while in the performance of it was his duty to detect and expose any
Ais duty as such, discovered a person violation of the revenue laws, without
setting fire to a building in his precinct, any other compensation than that which
and on the watchman's complaint he was attached to his office; and judgment
was convicted thereof, and punished, wa entered for the defendants.
The offer of a reward is only one
but the plaintiff was held not entitled to
the reward, on the ground that he had mode of making a contract, and the
done no more than his duty, which was same principles apply, as if an- actual
either to give notice to the mayor, or special contract had been made to paychief of police, or else make the com. officers extra for doing only their duty;
plaint himself, and have the arrest made and for which a fixed salary or fixed fees
immediately, and if he chcse to do the are established bylaw. In such cases the
latter, he did not thereby entitle himself decisions are uniform in both countries,
to the reward. It is true that in this that the officer cannot recover the extra
case the reward was offered by the city, compensation.
Thus in &otesbury v. Smith, 2 Burr.
in whose service the plaintiff was, and
to whom he owed his whole abilities, 924 (1760), the defendant promised a
but this fact does not seem to have been sheriff's bailiff who had arrested his
friend in a civil action, to pay him six
thought material by the court,
The same principle was again applied guineas, if he would accept the defendby the same court in Davies v. Burns, ant as his bail ; but although he accepted
5 Allen 349 (1862) ; in which the pro- him as offered, he was not allowed to
prietors of the Cunard line of steamers, recover, because if the defendant was a
offered a reward for information to the responsible party, he was bound to
agent or officers of their ships, of goods accept him, without compensation ; and
smuggled or intended to be smuggled if he was not responsible, he had no
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right to accept him, and therefore he
had violated his duty. This is a leading case. See also Bridge v. Case, Cro.
Jac. 103.
Htch v. Mann, 15 Wend. 45 (1835),
is a very strong case on this point. There
the defendant applied to a constable to
arrest his debtor on civil process, which
the officer at first declined to do, but
upon assurances of being well paid for
it, undertook the service, and went with
the defendant .to the man's house at 3
o'clock at night, and watched until daylight, when he succeeded in arresting
him. Held, he was not entitled to recover anything beyond his regUlar legal
fees fixed by statute, even though the
service was somewhat extra in its character, reversing an opposite decision in
9 Wend. 262. See also &tith v. Whilden,
10 Barr 39 (1848); Gillmore v. Lewis,
12 Ohio 281; .&aper v. Temple, 6
Humph. 113; Rea v. Smith, 2 Handy
193; Brown v. Godfrey, 33 Vt. 120.
But there may be cases where a sheriff
arrests persons outside of his jurisdiction, where he is entitled to the reward,
as much as any private citizen: Dams
v. Munson, 43 Vt. 676. See Ha]den v.
Songer, 56 Ind. 42.
So when the law makes it the duty of
pilots to give all the aid and assistance
in their power to any vessel appearing
in distress on the coast, and subjects
them to a fine for refusal or neglect so
to do, a contract to pay a pilot $500 extra for such duty is void. Callaghanv.
Ballet, I Caines 104 (1803). .
These and many other similar cases
might well have been decided on grounds
of public policy alone, and to avoid extortion which might be practised by officers, or persons in authority : but there
is another ground, weaker, perhaps, but
yet quite sufficient, on which they might
rest, viz : want of consideration ; for it
is elementary law that a promise to pay
a person for simply doing what he was
already under a legal obligation to do,
is invalitl for lack of consideration.
VOL. XXVII-38

The promisor receives only that to which
he was legally entitled without such
promise ; the promisee parts with nothing he was not bound to render. So that
the same result is reached between private parties, and when considerations
of public policy do not apply ; or if so,
with much diminished force. Therefore
a contract by a party to a suit to pay a
witness who has already been lawfully
summoned, and is bound to attend for
his legal fee, an additional compensation as an inducement or compensation
for his time, is not binding in law:
Willis v. Peckham, 4 J. B. Moore 300;
1 Brod. & Bing. 515; Colhns v. Godfrey, 1 B. & Ad. 950; Dodge v. Stiles,
26 Conn. 463.
For similar reasons a contract to
pay seamen an extra compensation for
merely doing their ordinary duty, for
which they shipped, and which is fully
covered by their contract, is not binding
upon the master or owners: Harris v.
Watson, Peake 102 (1791) ; &ilk v.
Meysic,
2 Camp. 317; 6 Esp. 129
(1809) ; Barttett v. Wyman, 14 Johns.
260 (1817) ; Harris v. Carter, 3 El. &
B. 559 (1854) ; TneAraminta, I Spinks
224. But reasons of public policy may
perhaps enter into this peculiar contract,
and strengthen the force of the objection
to its validity.
It is probably on this ground, in part
at least, that it was long ago held that a
promise by A. to pay B. for discharging C. from an udawful arrest, is not
binding, since B. was bound to discharge C. without any promise at all.
See Akison v. Settree, Willes 482
(1744); Herring v. Dorell, 8 Dowl. P.
C. 604. And see Dixon v. Adams, Cro.
Eliz. 538 (1596); Preston v. Bacon,
4 Conn. 471. "And this suggests the
much mooted question, in modem times,
whether a promise by A. to pay B. for.
fulflilling.his contract with C. is binding
if B. does nothing more, in time or
mode, than he was legally bound to C.
to do by his contract with him. Of

